AI agents and cybersecurity: the new habits to build
An agent that can read your repositories, run commands and call external tools is a new attack surface, not just a new tool. What to check before granting it access.
Giving an AI agent access to a terminal, a code repository or a mailbox changes the nature of the risk: it's no longer just "does this software have a flaw", but "can this piece of received text manipulate the agent into doing something other than intended".
Prompt injection, the most underestimated risk
An email, a ticket comment, or a web page can contain hidden instructions meant to hijack an agent that reads them — not the human user. An agent that processes external content needs to be designed to tell its operator's legitimate instructions apart from content it's merely analyzing.
Permissions, not trust
An agent should never have more access than its task actually requires: an agent that sorts emails doesn't need write access to your production infrastructure. This is a classic security principle (least privilege), but it's easier to forget when the party involved is an agent rather than a new employee.
What we set up
In Trustagents, every agentic instance receives permissions scoped precisely to its task, never broad access by default, with an audit log of every action taken — so that, in the event of an incident, we can answer exactly the question "what did the agent do, and why".
A question about your situation?
Request a free audit, we'll look at your specific case.